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Fraud  and  Foreign  Judgments
under Singapore law
A  foreign  judgment  is  generally  not  to  be  reviewed  on  the  merits  at  the
recognition and enforcement stage. Yet, an exception has always been carved out
for  fraud  under  the  common  law  rules  on  the  basis  that  ‘fraud  unravels
everything’  (Lazarus  Estates  Ltd  v  Beasley  [1956]  1  QB 702,  712  per  Lord
Denning). Thus, English courts allow a judgment debtor to raise fraud at the
recognition and enforcement stage even if no new evidence is adduced and fraud
had  been  considered  and  dismissed  by  the  court  of  origin  (Abouloff  v
Oppenheimer  &  Co  (1882)  10  QBD  295).  This  seeming  anomaly  with  the
prohibition against a review of the merits of a foreign judgment has been justified
on the basis that where fraud is concerned, the court of origin is misled, not
mistaken (Abouloff). The Abouloff rule has been much criticized, but successive
courts have refused to depart from it (see also Altimo Holdings and Investment
Ltd v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd  [2011] UKPC 7, [2012] 1 WLR 1804, [116] (Privy
Council)). Further, in Takhar v Gracefield Developments Ltd ([2019] UKSC 13,
[2020] AC 450) which is a case on fraud and domestic judgments, the Supreme
Court held that, generally, no requirement that the fraud could not have been
uncovered with reasonable diligence in advance of obtaining the judgment would
be imposed on the party seeking to set aside the judgment on the basis of fraud.
As one of the oft-cited criticisms for the Abouloff rule is that it is out of step with
how English courts deal with domestic judgments, Takhar may have the effect of
further embedding the Abouloff rule.
In Hong Pian Tee v Les Placements Germain Gauthier ([2002] SGCA 17, [2002] 1
SLR(R) 515), the Singapore Court of Appeal criticized the Abouloff rule on the
basis that it  would encourage ‘endless litigation’ and ‘judicial chauvinism’ (at
[27]-[28]). Drawing on Canadian and Australian authorities on fraud and foreign
judgments, the Court held that insofar as intrinsic fraud (ie, fraud which goes to
the merits of the case) is concerned, the foreign judgment may only be impeached
where ‘fresh evidence has come to light which reasonable diligence on the part of
the defendant would not have uncovered and the fresh evidence would have been
likely to make a difference in the eventual result of the case’ (at [30]).
The current position on fraud and domestic judgments under Singapore law is
that the fresh evidence rule applies, albeit flexibly (see, eg, Su Sh-Hsyu v Wee Yue
Chew [2007] SGCA 31, [2007] 3 SLR(R) 673).  However, the Court of Appeal
recently  considered Takhar  in  a  decision concerning a  domestic  adjudication
determination (AD). Adjudication is available under the Building and Construction
Industry Security of Payment Act (Cap 30B, Rev Ed 2006) and is a quick and
inexpensive  process  to  resolve  payment  disputes  arising  from  building  and
construction contracts. In Facade Solution Pte Ltd v Mero Asia Pacific Pte Ltd
([2020] SGCA 88), the Court of Appeal held that an AD could be set aside on the
ground of fraud. The party raising fraud would have to establish that the facts
which were relied on by the adjudicator were false; that the other party either
knew or ought reasonably to have known them to be false; and that the innocent
party did not in fact, subjectively know or have actual knowledge of the true
position throughout the adjudication proceedings (at [30]). The Court emphasised
that ‘there is no requirement on the innocent party to show that the evidence of
fraud could  not  have  been obtained or  discovered with  reasonable  diligence
during the adjudication proceeding’ (at [31]). It cited Takhar and the High Court
of Australia decision of Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (in Liquidation) [2018]
HCA 12 with approval,  the High Court  of  Australia  having also rejected the
reasonable  diligence  requirement  in  the  context  of  a  fraudulently  obtained
domestic judgment in the latter case.
The Court held (at [33]; emphasis added):
‘Where it is established that an AD is infected by fraud, it is neither material nor
relevant to inquire as to whether the innocent party could have discovered the
truth  by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  diligence.  A  fraudulent  party  cannot  be
allowed to claim that he could have been caught had reasonable diligence been
exercised, but because he was not caught, he should be allowed to get away with
it. Such a view would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and it
would be unprincipled to hold in effect that there is no sanction on the fraudulent
party because he could have been found out earlier. Parties dealing with the
court,  and in the same vein, with the adjudicator in the adjudication of their
disputes under the Act are expected to act with utmost probity.’
This passage suggests that the position on fraud and domestic judgments would
change in the near future. It also raises the question whether the requirement of
reasonable diligence in respect of intrinsic fraud and foreign judgments would
survive for long. On the one hand, the Court in Hong Pian Tee had said that:
‘There is no logical reason why a different rule should apply in relation to a
foreign judgment’ (at [27]) (ie, vis-à-vis a domestic judgment). The requirement of
reasonable diligence has also been criticized on the basis that the court would be
‘taking the side of the fraudster against his negligent opponent’ (Briggs, ‘Crossing
the River  by Feeling the Stones;  Rethinking the Law on Foreign Judgments’
(2005) 8 SYBIL 1, 21). On the other hand, there was a heavy emphasis on judicial
comity in Hong Pian Tee. The Court observed that: ‘It is … vitally important that
no court of one jurisdiction should pass judgment on an issue already decided
upon by a competent court of another jurisdiction …. It must be borne in mind
that  the enforcement  forum is  not  an appellate  tribunal  vis-à-vis  the foreign
judgment’ (at [28]).
It remains to be seen whether the Singapore Court of Appeal would in future
resile from Hong Pian Tee. At least, the recent developments in the domestic
context intimate that the point is arguable.
